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The remedy of expectancy damages in contract law is conventionally
described as strict liability for breach. Parties sometimes stipulate
damages in advance, and may agree that the damages they stipulate
shall be the exclusive remedy for breach. They may do so because of
their conviction that they can, even in advance, assess damages with
greater accuracy than courts, and they may be wary of litigation
costs associated with the postbreach determination of expectancy
damages. This Article advances two claims. First, that the familiar
expectation remedy is correctly understood to involve elements of
fault. There is litigation over the question of fault with respect to the
mitigation of damages. Stipulation, on the other hand, makes con-
tract liability stricter because it takes the mitigation question away
from courts. It allows less room for courts to modulate the remedy on
the basis of the parties' relative fault. Stipulation often encourages
mitigation by one party, but then, to make up for the strict liability
character, the parties may stipulate in a more detailed manner to en-
courage bilateral mitigation. Mitigation considerations should
change the way we think about many stipulated remedies. Second,
while law is generally described as being suspicious of or even hos-
tile to, stipulation-in large part because courts refuse to enforce
"penalty" clauses-in fact, law encourages stipulation. It does this
by sometimes declining to award expectancy damages, often in the
very situations where stipulation seems sensible, and also by provid-
ing expectancy damages where the award of stipulated damages is
regarded as a penalty. These two claims illuminate cases on such di-
verse matters as residential leases, construction contracts, product
warranties, service contracts with liability waivers, and no-show cus-
tomers and their service providers.
INTRODUCTION
The remedy of expectancy damages plays a central role in the conven-
tional statement of American contract law.' Specific performance is a
* Dean & William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am
grateful for comments received from Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat, Eric Posner, Julie Roin, and Zak
Rosenfield.
1. It once would have been enough to cite L.L. Fuller & W. R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 59-62 (1936) (expectation must be protected to
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smaller but well recognized feature, and it is prominent in some subsets of
contract law.' Both rules are usefully described as providing strict liability,
though occasional academic campaigns draw attention to the ways in which
fault permeates contract law. Fault is, of course, the foundational rule of
American, if not all, tort law, and there it is strict liability that plays the sup-
porting role.
The conventional statement also has something to say about stipulated
damages, a term I use to include liquidation to an amount of money, as well
as limitations on damages, scheduled damages, and other means of specify-
ing the remedy for breach in advance and by bargain. It is that when these
damages are "too high," measured either by actual damages expected at the
time of contract formation or damages suffered by breach, courts will often
disregard them as "penalty damages."3 The disappointed party is then nor-
mally free to revert to collecting expectancy damages.4 There is also a small
literature on "underliquidated damages," and while such clauses might also
be toxic to courts that hue to the expectancy-damage line of authority, they
are more often acceptable.5 Indeed, many waivers of liability can be under-
stood as successfully stipulated low-if not rock bottom-damages.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I locates stipulated damages in the
firmament of fault, and shows that the remedy of stipulated damages out-
flanks that of expectancy damages on the strict liability spectrum. Contract
law has been understood as deploying strict liability, but it is strict liability
only to a point-because once the "duty to mitigate" is at issue, fault comes
into play as courts consider the reasonableness of the post- and even the
prebreach mitigation efforts. Through a variety of means, courts can modu-
"promote and facilitate reliance on business agreements"), but specific performance and actual
damages would, of course, also protect reliance. Eventually, even the most doctrinal voices came to
see expectancy damages as the means by which American courts normally choose to encourage
reliance on promises. See 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 149-
50 (3d ed. 2004).
2. For example, specific performance applies to contracts for unique goods, U.C.C. § 2-
716(1) (2005), including transfers of interests in specific land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 360 cmt. e (1981); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1932).
3. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (referring to reasonableness in light of the "anticipated or actual"
harm or loss, and the difficulties of proof and of otherwise obtaining a remedy for breach); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356. The distaste for penalties may be related to the desire
to prohibit gambling, but my strategy here is simply to accept the old results-and then to recharac-
terize the law in this area.
4. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner,
J.) ("If the contractual specification of damages is invalid, Lake River still is entitled to any actual
damages caused by Carborundum's breach of contract...."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.18,
at 304 ("If a provision is condemned as a penalty, it is unenforceable. But the rest of the agreement
stands, and the injured party is remitted to the conventional damage remedy for breach of that
agreement, just as if the provision had not been included.").
5. The subject was shown to be interesting in Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative
Rules Under Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA L. REv. 898 (1983). The conventional view, how-
ever, continues to be that underliquidated-damage provisions present the completely different
problem of unconscionability, if they present any problem at all. See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-718 cmt. I
(stating that unconscionability is the means of striking underliquidated damages).
1366 [Vol. 107:1365
late damages according to the parties' relative shortfalls in these efforts.6 In
contrast, when the parties stipulate damages, they leave courts with less
room in which to operate. With stipulation, the parties agree not only to take
expectancy-damage determinations away from the court, but also to remove
questions about mitigation. The remedy of expectancy damages thus consti-
tutes a mixed system; there is, famously, strict liability with respect to
breach, but then there is fault-a kind of comparative fault-with regard to
mitigation. A stipulated-damage remedy can therefore be characterized as
super-strict liability because it does not normally vary according to the fault
of the parties, even when we take postbreach behavior into account. I ex-
plore this conception of contract remedies, and the idea of stipulated
damages as super-strict liability and as a means of removing mitigation from
the purview of the courts. In doing so, I illuminate classes of cases where
courts are more or less inclined to accept stipulated damages.
Part II proceeds to a second, independent point as it reexamines the con-
ventional wisdom that law is leery of, or, in effect, discourages, stipulated
damages-if only by dismissing those deemed to be "penalty damage"
clauses. I suggest that the opposite is true. In fact, the law may actually push
contracting parties toward stipulation. For example, the expectancy-damage
remedy is sometimes eviscerated by courts and, knowing this, parties will
sometimes choose to stipulate damages in advance. Alternatively, they may
simply prefer more strict liability. The real rule of contract remedies is prob-
ably that contracting parties should stipulate damages, at least when a
postbreach assessment of damages would require something more than a
comparison of market and contract prices. If this is right, then it follows that
contract law, at least in this realm, seems to prefer super-strict liability. This
reconception of contract remedies focuses attention on the strengths and
weaknesses of the remedy of stipulated damages, especially as it pertains to
mitigation.
I. STIPULATION, FAULT, AND MITIGATION
A. The Effect of Stipulated Damages on the Nonbreaching Party
Consider a case where the parties stipulate damages and custom, law, or
perhaps even the contract itself leads to the conclusion that the stipulation is,
or approaches the status of, an agreed-upon exclusive remedy. Common
residential leases fit this description. A, an apartment building owner, might
agree in July to rent premises to B for a one-year period, beginning Septem-
ber 1, at a rent of $2000 per month. Imagine that the lease agreement
provides for a $1500 deposit in the event of damages beyond normal wear
and tear, and also for a $2000 deposit to guarantee that the apartment will be
held for the September occupancy. The latter money can be applied toward
the last month's rent in August. In reality, the damage deposit is unlikely to
6. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983).
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be understood as stipulated damages, and to do so would create a series of
problems. But consider the situation in which the tenant, B, fails to materi-
alize on September 1, or announces just before that date that he will break
the lease. My interest here is in expectancy damages versus implicit stipula-
tion, and in the parties' mitigation efforts. Imagine that A is immediately
able to find another tenant, C, who agrees to pay the rent B had promised.
As a result, A's damages are close to zero, and yet in most cases we expect
A to retain the $2000 deposit, perhaps because it is hard for B to learn of the
agreement with C, because A is seen as a kind of lost-volume seller, or be-
cause the deposit compensates A (in a manner courts might subtly recognize
without articulating) for those other occasions when it is very difficult to
locate a new tenant. This is the situation where A does not find a new tenant
for some time, say ten months. In theory, A might then collect $20,000 from
B, but these expectancy damages are rarely awarded. Parties to a residential
lease have come to believe that if this part of the deposit is forfeited, it is the
landlord's exclusive remedy. This belief or implied provision that this "de-
posit" amounts to stipulated damages, is like that which we attach to a
storekeeper's sign declaring that there will be a $25 charge for a bounced
check. The amount is understood to be the exclusive remedy available to the
storekeeper, though it could turn out to be higher or lower than the actual
damages, despite the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code insists that a
contract be clear about an exclusive remedy.' In the case of both the breach-
7. For example, were B to destroy the apartment, we would expect A to be able to collect
more than $1500 from B, and if damage done by B were modest, we would expect B to get some of
the deposit returned. This must be true even if the parties have sloppily or inconceivably written that
their "deposit" is the exclusive remedy for damage. One way to think about the occasional judicial
distaste for liquidated damages is to see that nearly all stipulations can beget overliquidation, with
its risk of wasteful behavior. See Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties:
Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351, 369-72 (analyzing situations where breach inducement
is more likely, and emphasizing the inefficiency of such inducement). Courts might strive to get at
this problem by denying "penalty damages" even when the parties seem to have priced the danger in
their contract, by looking directly for wasteful behavior in the cases before them, or by rejecting
penalty clauses as a prophylactic measure to save themselves the burden of ferreting out antisocial
behavior even when there is no evidence of it. Alternatively, if we accept the idea that stipulated
damages amount to a strong form of strict liability, we might draw on the literature that celebrates
the efficiency of strict liability with a contributory negligence defense. If a court were to enforce this
$1500, penalty-looking provision, it might be expected to do so only where there was no hint or
evidence of contributory negligence on the landlord's part. This is not quite the efficiency formula
suggested by Clarkson et al., but it is close:
(1) [I]f neither party has an opportunity or incentive covertly to induce the other party to
breach, stipulated damage clauses should be freely enforced; and (2) if either party does have
opportunity and might have incentive, the clauses should be enforced only if they are reason-
able in relation to the damages sustained.
Id. at 352. An inquiry into the landlord's behavior seems straightforward; indeed it may seem im-
plausible that most landlords could increase the likelihood that their tenants would inflict modest
damage, beyond normal wear and tear. But it might be a small additional step to wonder whether a
court might not look at the tenant's mitigation efforts.
8. See U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (2005) (noting that provided remedies are optional "unless the
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy"). Comment 2 em-
phasizes the point in clearer language: "If the parties intend the term to describe the sole remedy
under the contract, this must be clearly expressed." Id. § 2-719 cmt. 2. In the landlord-tenant case,
the duty to mitigate is a modem development, modifying the landlord's ability to leave the premises
1368 [Vol. 107:1365
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ing tenant and the bouncing check, the stipulated amount is apt to be re-
garded as a reasonably good (ex ante) estimate of expectancy damages. In
the case of the check, actual damages might include another bank's fee as-
sessed against the storekeeper's account, as well as the loss that occurs
when the storekeeper writes checks based on an incorrect assessment of his
own bank balance-all of which could be reasonably thought to add up to,
or to average, $25. Similarly, in the residential lease case, we might imagine
that A, or even the typical landlord, averages one month to find a replace-
ment tenant.
This apparent treatment of the deposit as stipulated damages seems effi-
cient in this context. A is in the superior position to find a replacement
tenant.'0 The fixed damage amount gives A the right incentive to find C, and
at the best possible price." If instead the rule were that B retrieved the de-
posit in the event that A quickly found a replacement, A would have
diminished incentive to expend resources on the search. An expectancy-
damage rule runs a yet more serious risk that A will underinvest in the miti-
gation process. It is tempting to observe that custom has produced the more
efficient rule. It is, after all, custom that has glorified the deposit to a point
where it has become the automatic and exclusive remedy for breach, at least
in most residential settings, despite the ostensible rule that the remedy of
expectancy damages constitutes the default and preferred remedy for breach
in American law.'2
If the law were to abide by expectancy damages, A would have an obli-
gation to mitigate, and the court would have to confront obvious fact-finding
questions as to whether A advertised, searched, and priced the place in a
vacant and collect the remaining rents. 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 17.01
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2008). Statutes emphasize expectancy damages and give no support for the
convention that the landlord's exclusive remedy is the deposit. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1951.2(a)
(West 1985) (discussing the landlord's right to unpaid rents, subject to mitigation). More generally,
when parties liquidate damages, they sometimes, but not always, indicate that their assessment
represents an exclusive remedy in the event of breach. See infra text accompanying note 12.
9. There are also cases where the stipulated damages reflect the reimbursement of an up-
front discount in order to induce a contractual relationship. For example, a cell phone owner might
receive a discounted telephone at the start of a service contract, but owe a fixed amount in the event
of early termination. Similarly, an employee might receive a signing bonus, with the provision that a
significant amount is owed if the employee departs within a specified number of years. These sorts
of payments fit in the present analysis, but they can be set aside as reimbursements, and in any event
they do not implicate mitigation. In all three cases-residential leases, bounced checks, and cell
phone contracts-I resist the explanation that the breacher is expected to be judgment proof, or that
it does not pay to bring legal action. After all, landlords and tenants regularly sue over unreturned or
insufficient damage deposits.
10. In contrast, a nonprofessional, low-volume landlord might have more success pursuing
expectancy damages.
11. For an earlier observation of this point, that a fixed damage term can encourage optimal
mitigation by one party, see Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in
the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 117 (1989).
12. In the case of commercial real estate, and in other settings, the understanding may be
different, and I do not mean to overgeneralize. It is sufficient to see that stipulation can and does
play the roles described here.
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reasonable fashion as well as whether A was a lost-volume seller. 3 It is not
that the parties know in advance much more than the court will know fol-
lowing breach, but rather that they may agree not to expend resources
arguing about this matter. All in all, the stipulated-damage norm is nicely
efficient in getting A to undertake the mitigation, as A internalizes the costs
and benefits associated with the task of going forward once B breaches. And
it does this without imposing the fact-finding costs associated with com-
parative fault, which is a way of describing the usual treatment of the
parties' mitigation efforts.
B. The Effect of Stipulated Damages on the Breaching Party
The contrast with comparative fault draws attention to B's as yet unex-
plored behavior. Even if we assume that B has no capacity to find a
subletting tenant or other substitute, B is in control of the information re-
garding his own likelihood of breach. He can inform A of his plans early or
late in the game, and often decrease or increase A's (and the social) losses in
this way. In principle, the remedy of expectancy damages takes this into
account; the reasonableness of A's mitigation efforts will be a function of
B's, for mitigation is a joint venture. Thus, at first blush, super-strict liability
is likely to be inferior when efficient mitigation requires precautions by both
parties. Expectancy damages left room for an element of comparative fault
with respect to mitigation. Stipulated damages appear to give one party, but
one party only (A, the landlord, in our example) a strong incentive to miti-
gate. 4
Stipulated damages can, however, have some effect on B through addi-
tional stipulation, or what amounts to more careful contracting by the
parties. This form of more detailed stipulation is common in certain settings.
For example, newly admitted law students are accustomed to terms under
which they forfeit an increasingly large fraction of the first tuition payment
as the date of their withdrawal, or change of heart, falls later in the calendar.
Similarly, in the preceding example, A and B might have provided for B to
forfeit a larger fraction of the deposit as the date of breach approached Sep-
tember 1. Without such refinement, stipulated damages may be super-strict
in the sense that there is no fault determination, but also less-than-strict be-
cause the damages are capped. As detail is added, stipulation can
encourage mitigation on the part of both parties.
13. These questions could arise even if only the deposit were at issue, as B would likely
argue that the deposit is a ceiling on damages.
14. Of course, to the extent the litigation costs associated with expectancy damages' com-
parative-fault regime are very high, the apparent superiority of that scheme disappears.
15. Thus, in the example in the text, the $2000 deposit is owed without any inquiry into
mitigation, but it is less than strict liability in the sense that it offers only $2000, rather than the
$24,000 that an expectancy-damage remedy might generate. For a case where stipulation provides
super-strict liability, does not depend on mitigation (though it is likely efficient), and also should
have avoided litigation over mitigation and damages, see Barrie School v. Patch, 933 A.2d 382 (Md.
2007), in which the court enforced stipulated damages of entire year's tuition where parents with-
drew student from private school after specified date of May 3 1.
1370 [Vol. 107:1365
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The preceding example illustrates that while expectancy damages may
not normally depend on the reason for, or morality of, a failure to keep a
promise, these damages are supposed to be sensitive to the parties' mitiga-
tion efforts, and in this regard reasonableness of behavior is very much at
issue. We can imagine a fault-based system that inquires into the reason-
ableness of the breach itself, and we can understand stipulated damages as a
system that comes close to eliminating fault as a factor in both pre- and
postbreach activity. The expectancy-damage remedy normally falls in be-
tween these two, representing a kind of mixed (fault-strict liability) system,
because once a breach is contemplated, losses that could have been avoided
through mitigation are assigned according to a comparative-fault inquiry. In
most cases, a strict liability remedy, such as the homemade one of stipulated
damages, can give (at least) one party an incentive to mitigate.
The novel element in this picture of stipulation is that the parties may
reason that a commitment not to spend resources trying to show that the
other party was at fault will be cost effective. This is the key to the argument
in Part II below, where I suggest that in many situations courts may share or
simply accommodate this sense regarding the folly of calculating not only
expectancy damages, but also the costs and benefits of various mitigation
strategies. In these settings, the parties can see that they might need to fore-
go expectancy damages-and they can choose to stipulate damages instead,
or adjust to a high likelihood of (undeterred) breach.
The argument advanced thus far, that stipulated damages should be seen
as a kind of super-strict liability, is meant to supplement the familiar notion
that stipulation is simply a means of self-assessment, where the parties have
more information about losses from breach ex ante than courts will have ex
post.16 Under this view, when losses are easy to calculate ex post, as they are
when a defendant breaches the promise to deliver a good with an easily de-
termined market price, there is no reason to encourage stipulation, and the
parties themselves should have no reason to stipulate damages in advance.
The connection between the relative ability of the parties and courts to as-
sess damages, on the one hand, and the cost of encouraging and monitoring
mitigation efforts on the other, will become clearer when we add to the pic-
ture the inclination of courts to encourage stipulation.
II. ENCOURAGING STIPULATION
A. How Courts Encourage Parties to Stipulate
Courts often decline to award contract damages because that remedy can
be too speculative. In one representative case, a manufacturer delivered
16. There is also the idea that stipulation may obviate the need to reveal proprietary informa-
tion. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J.
1885, 1890-91 (2000) (describing a variety of contexts in which parties may avoid default rules or
litigation in order to protect valuable information). The advantages to some parties of super-strict




defective carpet to a dealer, yet the dealer's lost prospective profits were
regarded as too speculative and conjectural to warrant recovery. And in the
famous case of Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, the club collected most
of its provable expenses following the boxer's breach of an agreement to
appear in an exhibition fight, but not its lost profits, because they were "de-
pendent upon so many different circumstances that they are not susceptible
of definite legal determination."'" When new ventures are derailed by con-
tractual breaches, it continues to be likely that courts will decline to impose
expectancy damages, because the disappointed party's expectation is seen as
difficult to measure, inasmuch as there is no track record of past profits from
which to extrapolate damages. 9 Courts will, however, respect the stipulated-
damage provisions in these sorts of contracts. 2 It remains difficult to predict
when courts will decline to award damages because of the speculative na-
ture of that remedy. Even if we set new ventures aside, there will often be
wild and genuine disagreement over the damages caused by the breach of a
commercial contract. Dempsey's escape from serious liability is easy to
ridicule with the observation that although most losses are speculative,
courts can marshal predictive evidence, much as entrepreneurs do their best
to assess the profitability of various investments. Yet it is not uncommon for
expectancy damages to be denied because of the speculative character of
these predictions.
When courts deny expectancy damages, they effectively encourage sti-
pulation in future transactions, especially because parties have nothing to
lose by stipulating; even if courts disregard the stipulation, the option of
expectancy damages remains. Conventional wisdom, however, suggests that
contracting parties should be cautious about stipulation primarily because if
the specified amount looks high ex post, there is the danger that a court will
say it was also unreasonably high ex ante, when the parties ought to have
been assessing expected damages. If so, the provision will be labeled a pen-
alty and disregarded. But a better, and certainly contrarian, view is that on
17. Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1975). The court
declined to go along with a "general rule" that the anticipated profits of a commercial business
ought always be regarded as too speculative, but it did say that, where anticipated profits are con-
cerned, a plaintiff has a difficult burden of proof. Id. at 191 (quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Util. Battery Mfg. Co., 166 So. 856, 860 (Fla. 1935)). For another case where damages were thought
too speculative, but where parties can be seen as having engaged in a kind of stipulation, see Freund
v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y 1974), in which the court reduced damages
to six cents because there was no reliable way to determine the lost book sales or, derivatively, the
author's lost royalties from publisher's failure to publish, where the author had received a $2000
advance.
18. 265 1I1. App. 542, 549 (1932).
19. See, e.g., Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Assocs., 371 S.E.2d 532 (S.C. 1988) (finding
insufficient certainty to award lost profits but deciding to join the majority of jurisdictions in apply-
ing the "new business rule" as a rule of evidentiary sufficiency and not as an automatic preclusion to
recovery of lost profits by a new enterprise).
20. See, e.g., XCO Int'l, Inc. v. Pac. Scientific Co., 369 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding
$100,000 per year in liquidated damages where assignee allowed assignor's patent to expire, and




balance the law actually encourages stipulation. If the parties do not stipu-
late, there is the danger that damages will be regarded as speculative.
Stipulation allows the parties to avoid that result. And if stipulation is disre-
garded because of the penalty-clause doctrine, the injured party can still ask
for and receive expectancy damages, The cost of stipulation is, therefore, the
cost of assessment and negotiation (at least insofar as there will be no
breach later on, so that these are wasted expenditures) and also the cost as-
sociated with the danger of underliquidation. This last cost, however, can
normally be avoided by the parties' specifying that the stipulated-damage
term is a floor and not an exclusive remedy. If, however, the payment of the
stipulated damages is described as the exclusive remedy, then we can sur-
mise that either the parties prefer their own ex ante assessments (and
bargain) over a court's ex post determination or that they wish to commit to
avoiding litigation costs.'
B. Two Advantages of Stipulation: Knowledge and Mitigation
I have already suggested that stipulation allows parties to opt for strict
liability with respect to the question of mitigation. And we know that the
provision of stipulated damages is also a means of estimating damages
where the parties think that their knowledge and bargain are likely to be
superior to the courts' determination of expectancy damages. The courts
have the advantage of viewing the actual damages, while the parties cannot
wait until after breach to assess damages because, by then, their interests are
opposed. On the other hand, the parties have local knowledge and can vary
the price of their contract. We might label this familiar, first-order reason for
stipulation as "knowledge., 22 And by "mitigation" we could refer to the pos-
sibility of profitably avoiding the costs associated with litigating the
consequences of various mitigation strategies, even at the expense of reduc-
ing the incentive to mitigate. Contractual agreement on stipulated damages
might thus offer knowledge and mitigation advantages. And one way to
think about the cases is to ask whether they present one or both of these fea-
tures.
Of course, one risk of stipulation is that the parties sacrifice the com-
parative-fault inquiry that is buried within expectancy damages, as it
pertains to mitigation; the parties may not want super-strict liability. Fortu-
nately, when parties are encouraged to stipulate they are usually able to
count on one party's mitigation efforts, precisely because the stipulated-
damage clause gives that party a strong incentive to mitigate, as A was
21. Note that courts are not simply saving themselves work in one place, damage assess-
ment, in order to take it back on when evaluating claims that stipulated amounts should be excluded
as "penalties." The latter inquiry is more relaxed as courts need not be precise in order to rule
whether penalties have been provided.
22. And "knowledge" might be understood to include the protection of knowledge, as em-
phasized by previous commentators. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 6 (emphasizing throughout the
problems of private knowledge and cooperation); see also infra note 24.
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encouraged to do in the residential lease example above. The other party can
then be induced into contributory mitigation with more refined stipulation.23
A natural question to ask at this point is whether it is good that knowl-
edge and mitigation are "bundled" in the single tool of stipulated damages.
The parties might agree to avoid litigating over mitigation, but they may
think that a court's ex post damage assessment is superior to their own ex
ante guess. Conversely, they may prefer their own ex ante assessments, but
be willing to risk the costs of later litigation over mitigation because of the
incentive effects on mitigation. In principle, these problems can be solved
and the solutions unbundled. Parties could stipulate damages in order to
gain the knowledge advantage, but could provide that "the stipulated dam-
ages specified should be increased or decreased if either or both parties fail
to take steps to mitigate the losses caused by breach." I have not seen such a
contract. Lawyers may sense that courts will misinterpret or fail to enforce
such a mixed message about their own competence, or they may simply not
have thought about unbundling. Parties could also try to waive solely the
duty to mitigate. An agreement could provide that "the tenant shall take pos-
session on September 1, and shall owe no damages whatsoever for failing to
provide any notice regarding anticipated breach to the landlord before that
date." And, in between, contracts could try to specify what should or should
not be taken into account in determining damages.4
Dempsey is a case where unbundling the knowledge and mitigation at-
tributes of stipulated damages might have been useful. The club could have
stated its expected damages ex ante, and Dempsey could then have priced
the contract accordingly. It seems unlikely, though, that the parties would
have chosen to stipulate in order to avoid the comparative-fault inquiry we
associate with the duty to mitigate. The club might have mitigated, and re-
ceived some return on its preparatory expenditures, by looking for a
23. See supra text accompanying note 15.
24. In practice, parties inclined to stipulate damages in order to avoid litigation over mitiga-
tion will surely want to avoid litigation about expectancy damages, where they also enjoy a
knowledge advantage. The reverse is less obvious. Parties may wish to exploit their own knowledge
and take the determination of expectancy damages away from the court, but they may still fear
losses from the failure to mitigate enough to tolerate litigation over those losses. Careful stipulation
will help. For example, the carpet manufacturer (which may know its product is defective in time for
dealers to stock other inventory), Dempsey, and surely the tenant, B, can all be encouraged to reveal
coming breaches early in the game just as the withdrawing law student has an incentive to do, with
clauses that increase their damages as the revelation date is delayed.
In some settings, parties turn to insurance, but this does not mar the point about bundling miti-
gation and knowledge. Thus, when a construction company is employed to build a bridge or
renovate a place of business, the customer fears delay or abandonment. It might obtain or require a
performance bond, and include that premium in the price of the contract. The surety's price is one
check on the feasibility of the project, and on the schedule of payments due from the customer,
because it must stand ready to hire another firm to complete the project. Concurrently, the construc-
tion company may buy or require a payment bond, so that each side's performance under the
contract may be guaranteed. If the project is abandoned by the construction company, the customer
(and the insurer with a right of subrogation) may make a claim for this breach. Under these circum-
stances, stipulation may be less attractive. The parties might respond to the unavailability of
expectancy damages by demanding these sureties, and so we can think of the premium paid to an
insurer as a kind of stipulated damages, but paid ex ante. This is surely a form of super-strict liabil-
ity, where payment follows the activity rather than the breach.
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substitute-though heavyweight champions are hard to find. Dempsey could
have tried to do the same. The main claim here is that the very possibility of
a court's declaring expectancy damages to be too speculative encourages
future parties to stipulate. If they prefer a court to police mitigation, then the
benefits of stipulation come at a substantial cost, although the parties can
minimize this cost by agreeing on a schedule of stipulated damages.
Fretwell v. Protection Alarm Co. provides a contrasting case, in which
the court upheld a contract between a homeowner and a burglar alarm com-
pany. The contract stipulated $50 as the limit of liability, but negligence by
the company's employee, who failed to notify the police, arguably caused
the homeowner's $90,000 loss. 26 In contrast to Dempsey, not only did the
parties stipulate here but also their concern would surely have been about
litigating over mitigation rather than assessing damages. Parties to such a
contract can anticipate that damages will be easy to assess, because the
homeowner will provide proof of stolen property. There is, however, the risk
that questions surrounding mitigation will consume resources.2 ' For in-
stance, the alarm company can argue that even though it is strictly liable for
nonperformance, the property owner has the obligation to mitigate, or at
least not to be contributorily negligent; in the extreme, the homeowner can-
not possibly collect if he or she gave information to the thief and enabled
the crime. It is easy to imagine litigation over less dramatic contributions to
the loss-and the parties might sensibly choose to stipulate in order to avoid
such litigation.
These unbundled cases, where stipulation is responsive either to the par-
ties' superior ability to assess damages or to the difficulty of evaluating
mitigation efforts in court, are relatively rare. When the amount of expec-
tancy damages is hard to assess it will often be the case that both are
difficult to evaluate, if only because knowledge and mitigation are inter-
twined. A common example is that of a product sold with a repair-or-replace
warranty, or stipulation. Imagine that a photographer, P, purchases a camera
made by N, offered with just such a warranty, and that P suffers losses when
the unit malfunctions. Stipulation makes sense because damages can be
quite difficult to assess even ex post, and since they take the form of a
25. 764 P.2d 149 (Okla. 1988). A well known outlier is Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell,
Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio 1984), where a similar liquidated damages clause was thrown out as a
penalty, both because it was not a reasonable estimate of damages and because damages would
normally be easy to ascertain. The parties' language was perhaps unfortunate, and the court might
have treated the clause differently had it been fashioned as a limitation on liability. Fretwell also
raises the issue of a clause fashioned as liquidated damages, but treated by the court as involving a
limitation on liability, and therefore not subject to the claim that it was an inapt estimate of dam-
ages.
26. Fretwell, 764 P.2d at 150.
27. Some readers will be satisfied with the extant explanation and require neither knowledge
nor mitigation to do any of the heavy lifting in these cases. For example, causation may be an issue
because the crime might have been completed before a response team could have reached the site.
Alternatively, the parties might agree on zero damages because the homeowner is normally insured.
Finally, they may sense that, without the limitation, it will be too difficult to price the security ser-
vices ex ante, and a kind of adverse selection will drive the price too high. For more on the
underliquidation concern, see generally Warren, supra note 5.
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limitation on damages, they do encourage some mitigation on P's part. For
instance, P might travel with a backup camera. There may be no incentive
for N to mitigate, but in most cases there is little N can do by way of mitiga-
tion.2' P's mitigation will not completely eliminate the damages P suffers,
but these damages are difficult to assess.
I do not mean to say that stipulation is always encouraged by courts or
desirable for parties. First, there are cases where ex post determination is
easy, as when there is the failure to deliver or to purchase a widely sold
commodity, and where ex ante stipulation is more difficult or would simply
be deflected to an insurance contract. It happens that in these cases the task
of mitigation is easily allocated by contract or by default, so stipulation
would sacrifice little on that front, but stipulation is simply not needed in the
first place because the amount of expectancy damages is easily assessed.
Second, there are cases where the ability of courts to modulate damages in
the manner of comparative fault with respect to mitigation (or breach itself)
is palpably valuable because both parties may contribute to the delay, or
other breach. The parties may choose to stipulate in these settings, and to
sacrifice this benefit, but then they need to make their intentions clear. If
their underliquidation or overliquidation is too serious, we know that courts
may think they erred too much. A straightforward way to think about this is
not to emphasize what courts think or encourage, but rather to understand
parties as sometimes choosing super-strict liability for themselves.
C. Stipulation Through the Lens of Mitigation
The arguments advanced here are largely positive in nature, for I do not
make a claim as to when courts ought to encourage stipulation. A normative
argument would require some confidence in our ability to estimate the costs
of determining fault and the costs suffered by encouraging a remedy, stipu-
lated damages, that is more difficult to modulate according to the relative
fault of the parties. The positive-normative line would be blurred somewhat
if there were more obvious patterns with respect to courts' disregarding sti-
pulated damages or with regard to their encouraging stipulation by denying
expectancy damages. But the denials do not seem linked to the breacher's
wrongdoing, willfulness, or opportunistic behavior;9 they do not seem tied
28. If some disclosure by N would be useful, as when N learns of a problem from other
users, it is possible that the contract or legislation will step in to encourage disclosure, or mitigation.
Moreover, where damages include personal injury, as is the case where automobile and pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers could provide notice of dangers, stipulation is likely to fail in the first place.
29. Thus, stipulated damages are often struck as penalties where there is no opportunism,
perhaps because the clause makes no attempt to anticipate actual damages, and also where there is
objectionable behavior. See Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1991) (holding serious breach
of fiduciary duty as breach of contract, but finding stipulated damages excessive compared to actual
losses). At the same time, stipulated damages are often accepted even where there is opportunism.
See, e.g., N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., 461 N.E.2d 1049 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that a pe-
troleum ether supplier could collect no more than the stipulated damages after its gas company
customer opportunistically terminated the contract).
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to the identity of the claimant;0 and they do not come more readily when the
stipulation is customized or boilerplate.] The argument advanced here is
thus cast as a positive one, explaining repair-or-replace clauses and a variety
of other cases as we have seen.
Consider, finally, everyday cases where the conventional rules of con-
tract remedies appear to be ignored. R orders a taxi from T in order to travel
to an airport. If T fails to materialize as agreed upon, and R loses the value
of a nonrefundable ticket (as could have been well anticipated by T), we do
not expect R to recover these expected damages from T. Symmetrically, if T
appears at R's door and R had accepted a ride with a friend, T may have lost
other business, but does not expect to collect from R, unless damages were
stipulated. In some sense the case is mysterious; it is almost as if all we read
in contract treatises has no application in the real world. After all, the dam-
ages here are not particularly difficult to determine ex post, so that
stipulation does not seem superior to expectancy damages on the usual
grounds. We might imagine highlighting the nonspeculative costs associated
with taking a later flight, and T pointing to its wasted time because of R's
breach, in hopes of recovering at an hourly rate. But the case can be de-
scribed neither as one of strict liability for failure to perform nor as one
reflecting the imposition of fault or comparative fault. Even if R could easily
have called T to cancel the trip, or T could have contacted R two hours in
advance to encourage R to find another means of transport to the airport, we
know that, in the absence of stipulation, no damages will be paid for the
failure to take these steps. While at first glance this might seem like the
wrong result, the picture is easier to rationalize once we bring mitigation
into play. It would be hard to know how easy it really would have been for R
32to rush to the airport by another means, or for T to find other business. We
30. Compare Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494 (N.D. 1974)
(holding that the breaching party is permitted to invoke the stipulated-damages clause as damage
limitation), with Carolinas Cotton Growers Ass'n v. Arnette, 371 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.C. 1974) (holding
that the breaching party is not permitted to limit its liability to the stipulated-damages clause under
similar circumstances); compare also Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904 (Idaho
1993) (permitting breachee to seek damages in excess of the stipulated amount), with J. D. Pavlak,
Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 351 N.E.2d 243 (I11. App. Ct. 1976) (limiting breachee's damages to the
stipulated amount). Arrowhead School District No. 75, Park County v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250 (Mont.
2003) is an especially convenient case, as there is opportunity for joint mitigation, and enforcement
against the breaching party. The contract stipulated damages equal to twenty percent of a teacher's
annual compensation. The breaching party resigned just two weeks before the start of the academic
year. A replacement teacher was found at a slightly lower salary, but with some effort and of quality
not easily measured.
31. Thus, a repair-or-replace remedy for a defective product is normally upheld. See, e.g.,
Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976). But often so are earnest mon-
ey agreements in real estate transactions, customized as they may be. See, e.g., United States v.
Ponnapula, 246 F3d 576, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). But see Weber v. Rivera, 841 P.2d 534 (Mont. 1992)
(refusing to enforce the clause in a real-estate sales form contract requiring the defaulting party to
pay ten percent of purchase price).
32. There is the question of why it is so rare to see parties to this kind of contract agree upon
stipulated damages. We do see some expensive restaurants asking for credit card information when
taking reservations, and then imposing a stipulated fee for the patron's failure to materialize. Even if
the taxi company stipulates X dollars for R's failure to wait, R may breach either because the altema-
tive ride is free or because R fears missing a flight. And if Y dollars is stipulated for Ts failure to
1377June 20091
Michigan Law Review
might think of customary law as offering a default stipulation of zero dam-
ages, so that the parties need not litigate the facts of mitigation.
CONCLUSION
As a normative matter there is something to be said for complete free-
dom of contract. From this position it is easy to rail against cases that do not
enforce the parties' stipulations, and then to complain also about cases that
do not provide expectancy damages, or another remedy, where the parties
appear to have planned on the supply of the given remedy. On the other
hand, over- and underliquidation can cause inefficiencies that parties may
not have anticipated, and these may be avoided if courts judiciously inter-
vene to prevent palpable waste. To this calculus we must now add the idea
that just as parties might sometimes wish to avoid a court's assessment of
expectancy damages, so too they might sometimes choose to avoid a court's
assessment of their mitigation efforts. Stipulation in various currencies thus
produces super-strict liability in contract law. It does so by adding strict li-
ability regarding mitigation to the usual strict liability as to the fact of
breach. Where mitigation is important, contract law is a comparative-fault
regime, and its strict liability component fades in the background. In an im-
portant subset of these cases, the parties will prefer strict liability and they
will stipulate damages-sometimes partial and sometimes a good estimate
of full-expectancy damages-in order to achieve this result. In another sub-
set, they will count on courts to police their efforts in comparative-fault
fashion. And in a surprisingly significant third group of cases, they will not
stipulate, even knowing that courts will decline to impose liability.
The other reconception suggested here, that contract law effectively en-
courages the stipulation of damages, is a weaker though more startling
claim. The doctrinal knowledge of most lawyers is, after all, limited in this
regard to the fact that one must be careful not to overliquidate and enter the
realm of penalty damages. But as we look at the variety of cases, it is appar-
ent that the presumed remedy of expectancy damages is disrespected by
courts at least as much as the contractual provision of stipulated damages.
And inasmuch as the remedy of expectancy damages is still available when
a penalty damage term is disregarded, there will be many circumstances in
which parties will do well to stipulate damages. Certainly, such stipulation
does sometimes introduce the problem of an insufficient incentive to miti-
gate, especially when mitigation requires joint effort, but this problem can
pick up R as promised, T will still breach if another customer, S, pays a sufficiently higher price-
though we have no reason to think that S values the ride more than R, whose fare was likely deter-
mined by a fixed schedule. But bargaining can encourage earlier transmittal of information. It might
pay for R to stipulate that "I will pay you fifty dollars if I am a no-show, but only thirty dollars if I
give more than one-hour notice." Similarly, we do find restaurants excusing the penalty with enough
notice. But it is also possible that we do not often find more detailed stipulation because such stipu-
lation might be thought to encourage breach, as it offers a price for breach. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo
Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (finding that charges, or fines, at least
within limits, increased rather than decreased late pickups at daycare centers). Still, at the right
price, breach ought to be welcome. Some restaurants and airlines do seem comfortable with no-
shows, once fees have been included.
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be reduced with yet more detailed stipulation. Courts may want to take these
points into account when striking or enforcing stipulated-damage clauses
and when adjudicating mitigation disputes. As is often the case, a positive
theory of the behavior of parties and courts is likely to bear on the normative
questions associated with legal rules and private practices.
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